Climbing the Golden Stairs - Kokoda

15. The first painful lesson

2011-02-15T13:56:00.002+11:00

The Japanese landed at Buna on July 21 1942. Despite air attacks by allied aircraft the Japanese had landed their task force, unchallenged on land, during that night. Allied observers posted along the coast had radioed this event to Port Moresby but received no response..

At Port Moresby, Major-General Morris was ordered to establish one battalion at Kokoda immediately. Lieutenant-Colonel Owen and his 39^th Battalion was ordered to leave by air for Kokoda on July 23 and assume command of all allied troops on the northern ramparts of the trail, including Templeton’s force, some Papuan infantry, planters and Patrol Officers. This force were named “Maroubra Force”!

Templeton had pushed two of his three platoons forward to ‘stage a delaying action’. His third platoon occupied Kokoda, guarding the airstrip there. The Japanese were easily able to push the Australians back, their numbers and their drill were far superior.

The Japanese jungle fighting tactics were to send a scout forward (expendable) and when fired upon they would follow up with a strong frontal attack in which quick casualties were the accepted norm. The speed in which they encircled and destroyed and enemy reflected their lightly equipped infantry, their excellent camouflage and, above all, their tremendous and almost silent deployment. To the inexperienced Australians, the enemy’s preoccupation with his continual frontal attack merely ensured that they would encircle and overrun any static defenders. The Japanese infantryman was the epitome of the jungle fighter; lightly equipped, even his food supplies were meagre – a ball of rice, some seaweed and , perhaps, some dried fish – enough to survive on for 24 hours, he travelled light, fast, was practised in most matters of jungle warfare and, most of all, he was prepared to lay down his life for his Emperor.

(with acknowledgement and thanks to "Trails of war")

In a series of engagements from Gorari to Kokoda the two platoons of B Company 39^th battalion were engaged in almost constant contact and withdrawal. It was during these forays that Templeton, while insisting on leading from the front, disappeared.

It later was learnt that Captain Templeton was captured, tortured and executed:

Kokichi Nishimura stands in front of his

house in Kazo, Saitama Prefecture

Japan Times - on-line

“…. Kokichi Nishimura, The Bone Man of Kokoda, ….(returned) to the site at Oivi Village where he stated he had buried Captain Templeton. ………. Nishimura did not suddenly remember that he had buried Templeton 68 years previous, he had just assumed that Templeton’s remains had been recovered and re buried on the Australian’s advance. It was not until I returned to Japan that Templeton’s name came up in a conversation with Nishimura and he recounted the events to me. He was surprised that his remains had not been recovered.

Nishimura still clearly remembers the day he stumbled upon the bloated and rotting remains of Captain Templeton. Nishimura did not discover Templeton’s body until six days after Templeton’s execution. It is important to remember Nishimura arrived six days after the execution and was not a witness to the execution.

How could Nishimura remember the spot so clearly after 68 years? The event was clearly etched in his memory, the sight of the body, the smell and the waterfall that the body lay near. If you ever had a chance to meet Nishimura or read his book The Bone Man of Kokoda then you would understand he is a man of high honour and exceptionally intelligent, he has nothing to gain from assisting me. …”

(With appreciation to Wayne Weatherall at Kokoda Spirit Blog )

During a brief action at Oivi a concentration of Japanese firepower was assembled at the rear of the defenders who answered with grenades and rifle fire before a degree of panic broke out, abandoning the position the defenders had no hope of defending. Some pushed forward to their original front whilst others retreated to their rear and almost certain annihilation. If was the bush craft of a native policeman, Sanopa, serving with the Papuan Infantry battalion, that saved most of those moving forward and cut-off many heading for the rear where a strong enemy force lay in wait for them. Amongst the fierce actions fought that day there was much understandable confusion amongst the poorly trained and ill-equipped militiamen.

Kokoda Walkway - click to enlarge

Kokoda Walkway

With these events in train, Lieutenant-Colonel Owens decided that the the Trail was easier to defend than Kokoda Village so he took the decision to fire the buildings and stores and to fall back to Deniki. To his latter amazement, on arrival at Deniki, he was told that the Japanese had still not occupied Kokoda. Owen thought he may still have time to reinforce Kokoda by air, so, leaving a small force at Deniki he could hurry back to Kokoda. If his small force of around 80 men could hold Kokoda airstrip long enough reinforcements might land.

The second painful lesson was about to be learned in a desparate battle which bravery was defeated by overcaution.

14. The 30th Brigade in Port Moresby

2011-02-14T11:46:00.003+11:00

The 30^th Brigade’s Battalions in Port Moresby:

While sweeping political and military events were occurring in the Middle East, Australia and the Philippines, the garrison at Port Moresby – mainly the 30^th’s Brigades 38^th, 49^th and 53^rd Battalions - had primarily been involved in labouring duties rather than the training they so desperately needed. Unloading ships, building roads constructing defensive positions, digging trenches and stringing barbed wire whilst constantly losing the battle against malaria, dengue fever and dysentery.

In April 1942, Major-General Vasey wrote to subordinate army commanders requesting monthly reports concerning the combat efficiency of brigades in the army. He gave six guidelines for rating efficiency:

A. Efficient and experienced for mobile offensive operations.

B. Efficient as a formation for mobile offensive operations but not experienced.

C. Individual brigades are efficient for mobile operations, but higher training has not been completed.

D. Individual brigades are efficient in a static role. Additional brigade and higher training is required.

E. Units have completed training. A considerable amount of brigade and higher training is required.

F. Unit training is not yet complete.

Five weeks before the 30^th Brigade was committed to action on the Kokoda Trail its grading was given as ‘F’.The garrison at Port Moresby was thus given the lowest possible rating while being deployed in the most threatened area.

The Japanese commenced bombing Port Moresby on the 3^rd February 1942. Natives fled and Coastal ship desertions were high. Three of the five Catalina flying boats were sunk by Japanese Zero attacks leaving those two and a lone Hudson bomber for air defence of the garrison. Eventually a long promised squadron of Kittyhawk fighters arrived. As the situation deteriorated in the South West Pacific Area during April it was decided to put a more positive emphasis on the defence of Port Moresby.

Squadron Leader Keith ‘Bluey’ Truscott steps out of the cockpit

of his Kittyhawk fighter as fellow pilots of 76 Squadron RAAF

help to push it back into the dispersal bay. - [AWM 026648]

Brigadier Selwyn Porter was despatched to take command on 17^th April.

As the former commanding officer of the 2/31^st battalion in Syria, Porter bought with him a distinguished Middle Eastern record and a youthful, driving personality to the garrison. The 2/31st Infantry Battalion had a battle honoured background. It was one of three formed in the United Kingdom on 27 June 1940 to create the 25th Infantry Brigade. The battalion’s personnel were drawn from throughout the Australian force that had arrived in Britain earlier in the month. It left Britain on 4 January 1941 and disembarked in Egypt on 9 March. Upon arrival, the 2/31st moved to Palestine for training where it was joined by a fourth rifle company. On 11 April, the 25th Brigade, now part of the 7th Australian Division, began to move to Egypt to bolster the defences along the Libyan frontier against an expected German attack and the 2/31st occupied positions at Mersa Matruh. In late May 1941, the 2/31st returned to Palestine to take part in the 25th Brigade’s first offensive operation - the invasion of Syria and Lebanon. The 2/31st’s first major engagement in eastern Lebanon was around Khirbe between 8 and 11 June. It was subsequently ordered to capture the town of Jezzine, which controlled one of the lateral routes to the coast. Jezzine fell to the 2/31st on 14 June but was heavily counter-attacked by the Vichy French on the 16th. The terrain around Jezzine was steep and rugged and the fighting exhausting; it was still in progress when the armistice was declared on 12 July. The 2/31st remained in Lebanon as part of the Allied garrison until 13 January 1942.

Selwyn Porter (left in service cap) and other

24th Brigade officers at Beaufort, Borneo

in August 1945

Upon arrival, Porter soon realised that he faced four critical problems:

1. The quality of defences were such that they were easily identified from the sea, far too dispersed, static and therefore restricted in mobility.

2. The garrison’s overall poor standard of leadership.

3. No real battle training had been implemented.

4. The brigade was poorly equipped with outdated equipment.

While not able to do much about the equipment problems, Porter injected young, trained and experienced officers from the 7^th Division as reinforcement officers to assist in leadership and training and used age and health issues of the older officers as an excuse to send those back to Australia. Unfortunately a few of the older officers escaped the net.

1. The 39^th Battalion:

Following Japan’s sudden entry into the Second World War, a new 39th was raised as part of the 30th Brigade to garrison Port Moresby. The 39th joined the 49th Infantry Battalion, already in Moresby, and the 53rd Infantry Battalion, which had been quickly formed in Sydney. The 39th arrived in Moresby at the start of January 1942, with little military training. The 39th was initially used for garrison duties and working parties. In June it was ordered to proceed up the Kokoda Trail to block any possible Japanese overland advance.

2. The 49^th Battalion:

A new 49^th Battalion was raised for “tropical service” in February 1941. The following month the battalion sailed to the islands as part of the convoy that took the 2/22nd Infantry Battalion to Rabual. Along the way the convoy stopped at Thursday Island and a group from the battalion, mainly from A Company, stayed to garrison the island. This group was initially called the 49th Battalion Details and in January 1942 became known as the Thursday Island Infantry Detachment. The rest of the battalion arrived in Port Moresby.

The battalion undertook little training in Moresby and mainly provided labour for working parties and unloaded ships’ stores. In 1941 the 39th and 53rd Battalions joined the 49th, forming the 30th Brigade. During this time the 49th’s morale was low and had reportedly the worst discipline in Moresby.

Japan entered the war at the end of the year and by the start of 1942 was rapidly advancing through south-east Asia and the Pacific. By March Japanese aircraft were attacking Moresby. The garrison at Moresby was strengthened to cope with the battles along the Kokoda Trail and at Milne Bay, yet there was little change to the 49th’s routine and their training remained basic. One veteran described the work as “digging holes”.

3. The 53^rd Battalion:

The 53rd Battalion was an infantry battalion of the Australian Army. Raised in 1916 for service during World War I the battalion served on the Western Front until the end of the war, before being briefly amalgamated with the 55th Battalion and then eventually disbanded in 1919. In 1921, the 53rd Battalion was re-raised and in 1927 adopted the title of the West Sydney Regiment, however, in 1937 they were once again amalgamated with the 55th, forming the 55th/53rd Battalion (New South Wales Rifle/West Sydney Regiment). In October 1941, during World War II, the two battalions were delinked and the 53rd was later deployed to New Guinea, where they took part in the Kokoda Track campaign. Poorly prepared and trained, and lacking up to date equipment, they did not perform well and were amalgamated with the 55th once more in October 1942, with whom they subsequently took part in further campaigns in New Guinea and Bougainville.

On 21 June 1942 36 AIF officers from the 7^th Division had been posted to the 30^th Brigade – 16 to the 39^th Battalion, 8 to the 53^rd Battalion and 12 to the 49^th battalion. Eight Lieutenants went straight to platoon level, where, in particular, basic training is successfully implemented under a capable officer commanding a company. These officers and the young, enthusiastic militia officers that had been retained performed magnificently under pressure of having little time.

Thus the 39^th Battalion, manned by volunteers for tropical service and led in June 1942 by a very capable bunch of battle-experienced AIF and young and enthusiastic militia officers was a battalion in change. Not so the 53^rd Battalion, as the majority of the militia company commanders were over 40 years of age and while some were proficient a number of company commanders were slow in reacting to orders or unable to do so.

Back in Australia MacArthur had been ordered by the Chief of Staff in America to take Rabaul. He ordered a small party of mixed American and Australian officer to the North Coast of Papua to find a suitable site for an airfield from which he might carry the war forward. An area north-east of Dobodura was considered suitable.

As a consequence of such thinking, Blamey instructed Major-General Morris on the 29^th of June to “… secure Kokoda!...”. Brigadier Porter was ordered to send a rifle company over the Kokoda Trail to fulfil this order. Captain Sam Templeton was ordered to march his company over the Kokoda Trail and meet the lugger Gili Gili at Buna.

Captain Sam Templeton V50190

Templeton was an older officer – in his 50’s – and referred to as “Uncle Sam” by his mostly adolescent soldiers. He had been refused service with the AIF because of his flat feet and age.

“He had fought in the Irish rebellion and the First World War and this was to be his last fling. He set an example to the whole company in other words. I think he realise that we were a lot of young blokes …. A man that you couldn’t get to know very well, but he always said that if he went into action against the Japs, he wouldn’t come back and that’s exactly what happened, he told me that.”

(Lieutenant A.J. “Judy” Garland, Platoon Commander.)

It was extraordinary to contemplate that the first Australian contact in PNG against the best jungle fighters in the world at that time, was to be undertaken by a company of raw young militiamen , graded fighting proficiency “F” and led by a commander who was over 50 and had flat feet. Yet Templeton was to prove an inspiration to his young soldiers and create a name legacy that survives on the Kokada Trail until this very day!

13. Climbing "The Golden Stairs"

2011-02-01T10:03:00.000+11:00

The ‘Golden Stairs’ rise towards Imita Ridge

on the Kokoda Track, photographed in

October 1942. [AWM 26837]

Peter Brune, in "A bastard of a place" (Allen and Unwin, 2003) wrote:

"In 1942, take the best of the youth of Australia and take them at their physical peak, burden them with equipment weighing anywhere between 50 and 70 pounds (22 to 31kg). Dress them in a khaki uniform designed for the desert, not the jungle,pose them to a claustrophobic environment that will test their alert minds; and send them across terrain that will exhaust the fittest of them. Feed them so sparingly that they will lose two or three stone in weight (13 to 19kg) over a period of six to eight weeks; expose them to humid sweating days and cold wet nights, blessed only with half a blanket or a groundsheet; put them in a weapon pit full of water; isolate them, by creating a situation where they can only be re-supplied by air or overtaxed Papuan carriers, and never to a degree where they can gain sufficient strength to perform at their optimum level.

These young soldiers are not naive; they know that the further they struggle forward, the further they slip away from their supplies - bullets and tucker - and in everyman's mind the daunting thought of a wound. Will there be enough stretchers, enough carrier, to take them out, and critically, if they cannot crawl out or stagger out the price of falling into the enemies hands."

The Kokoda Track [DVA]

Prior to the outbreak of the war in PNG travellers had two ways to move from Port Moresby to the north coast across the Owen Stanley Range - fly over it or sail around it. There were no roads. The Papuans had their own trails, including the hazardous one over the Owen Stanley Range. A primitive foot track, at most three or four feet wide (about a metre wide), restricting movement in most places to single file and only scant knowledge of this track had reached the outside world through occasional reports of patrol officers, planters, miners or missionaries.

The "Golden Stairs" consisted of several thousand pieces of wood shoved into the ascent and held in place by wooden pegs. Filthy, putrid, mud constituted the rest of the 'step'. At some points the exposed roots of trees formed the 'steps', thus making them irregular. The stairs became permanently soaked and sodden because of the daily rains that saturated the jungle. Men fell, banged knees, shins and ankles on the exposed steeps, gave vent to their anger and struggle agonisingly to their feet; and orderly progress became impossible as long strings of exhausted climbers backed up down the track waiting for a chance to move forward.

Lieutenant Hugh Dalby, 39th Battalion:

"They were so steep . . . we soon had it worked out that instead trying to walk over the mountain range in sections as we started off doing, and nearly killed ourselves, the next day we set off at intervals . . . so you might be five minutes getting rid of your men. But instead of getting to the next staging place at five o'clock at night when t was dark, you'd get there at two o'clock in the afternoon 'cos you wern't hampered by this stop, start, stop, start routine."

Whether the overburdened soldiers travelled up or down, he experienced the unending aching of strained knees and a suffering back never designed to carry a heavy load over the Owen Stanley Range. After his last sporadic bursts, of desperate joint-wrenching, lung-bursting scaling of the "Golden Stairs", many a sweat-sodden campaigner reached Ioribaiwa utterly worn out, disoriented and huddled in the chill of the night nearly 3,000 feet above sea level , completely exhausted, unable to fight and only seeking to rest and recuperate for the next day of trekking the trail.

When the Japanese first landed in Papua there was much talk of "the Kokoda Pass". But there was no pass—merely a lowering of the mountain silhouette where the valley of Eora Creek cut down into the Yodd a Valley south of Kokoda . From Kokoda the track slipped easily down towards the sea for three full days of hot marching . First it passed over undulations fringed by rough foothills and covered with thick bush. It forded many streams, passed through the villages of Oivi and Gorari, went on down to the Kumusi River which, deep and wide and swift, flowed northward and then turned sharply east to reach the sea between Gona and Cape Ward Hunt.

This was the country of the fierce Orokaivas, unsmiling men with spare, hard, black bodies and smouldering eyes . They were still greatly feared by all their neighbours although it was many years since Europeans first came and forced peace upon them. They suffered at the hands of the Yodda Valley gold-seekers at the end of the nineteenth century and the severity of the magistrate Monckton at the beginning of the new century, and it was said that they had not forgiven either occasion. Their kinsmen, the coastal Orokaivas farther on, were of the same type. The track crossed the Kumusi by a bridge suspended from steel cables. The place of crossing came thus to be known as Wairopi (the "pidgin" rendering of "wire rope"). A little farther on, in the vicinity of Awala, began a network of tracks which passed over tropical lowlands through or past Sangara Mission and Popondetta into spreading swamps and thus reached the coast on which were the two little settlements of Buna and Gona—the former the administrative headquarters of the district, the latter a long-established Church of England mission. Up to July 1942 Australian military interest in this lonely coast and the even lonelier track which linked it with Port Moresby was of slow growth.

On 2nd February Major-General Rowell, then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, had signalled Major-General Morris:

Japanese in all operations have shown inclination to land some distance from ultimate objective rather than make a direct assault. This probably because of need to gain air bases as well as desire to catch defence facing wrong way. You will probably have already considered possibility of landing New Guinea mainland and advance across mountains but think it advisable to warn you of this enemy course.

Morris, with a difficult administrative situation on his hands, only meagre and ill-trained forces at his disposal and more likely military possibilities pressing him, that month sent a platoon (Lieutenant Jesser) of the Papuan Infantry Battalion to patrol the coast from Buna to the Waria River, the mouth of which was about half-way between Buna and Salamaua, and watch for signs of a Japanese approach.

On 10th March a Japanese float-plane swept over Buna about 11 a.m., bombed and machine-gunned two small mission vessels there, then settled on the water . However, it was promptly engaged with rifle fire by Lieutenant Champion,' the former Assistant Resident Magistrate, and the small group with him, who were staffing the Administration and wireless station on the shore, and it quickly took the air again. At the end of March the Combined Operations Intelligence Centre, in an assessment of the likelihood of Japanese moves to occupy the Wau-Bulolo area after the seizure of Lae and Salamaua, had suggested the possibility of a landing at Buna with a view to an overland advance on Port Moresby.

But little serious consideration seems to have been given to this suggestion.

The Japanese expedition against Port Moresby, turned back by the Allied naval forces in the Coral Sea, had underlined the need to reinforce the troops and air squadrons in New Guinea.

Japanese Attack Plan

Initial movements (Battle of the Coral Sea)

On 14th May MacArthur wrote to Blarney that he had decided to establish airfields on the south-east coast of Papua for use against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul, that there appeared to be suitable sites between Abau and Samarai, and he wished to know whether Blarney had troops to protect these bases. Blarney had already ordered the 14th Brigade to Port Moresby and it embarked at Townsville on the 15th. He replied, on the 16th, that he could provide the troops, and MacArthur, on the 20th, authorised the construction of an airstrip in the Abau-Mullins Harbour area . At the same time he ordered that the air force bring its squadrons at Moresby up to full strength and that American anti-aircraft troops be sent from Brisbane to the forward airfields at Townsville, Horn Island, Mareeba, Cooktown and Coen.

The 14th Brigade, with only about five months of continuous training behind it (although most of the individual men had had more than that), was thus the first substantial infantry reinforcement to reach Moresby since General Sturdee had sent two battalions there, making a total of three, on 3rd January, four months before the Coral Sea battle. When the inexperienced 14th Brigade was sent forward there were, in eastern Australia , three brigades of hardened veterans—the 18th, 21st and 25th—but unwisely none of those were chosen.

12. The Commanders

2011-01-31T13:40:00.003+11:00

1. The Japanese Commander

General Tomitarō Horii

Tomitarō Horii, November 7, 1890 – November 23, 1942) was a major-general in the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II. He was an experienced infantry commander having served with distinction in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Born in Hyōgo Prefecture, Horii became an infantry officer following his graduation from the 23rd class of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1911.He was later assigned to the headquarters of the Shangai Expeditionary Army during the January 28 Incident from January 28-March 4, 1932.

(Note: on the midnight of January 28th, Japanese carier aircraft bombed Shanghai in the first major aircraft carrier action in the Far East. Three thousand Japanese troops proceeded to attack various targets, such as the northern train station, around the city and began an invasion of the de facto Japanese settlement in Hongkew and other areas north of Suzhou Creek. In what was a surprising about-face for many, the 19th Route Army, who many had expected to leave after having been paid, stayed to put up a fierce resistance.

Though the opening battles of the conflict took place in the Hongkew district of the International Settlement, this soon spread outwards to much of Chinese-controlled Shanghai. The majority of the Concessions remained untouched by the conflict, and it was often the case that those in the Shanghai International Settlement would watch the war from the banks of Suzhou Creek, and could even visit the battle lines by virtue of their extraterritoriality. Being a metropolitan city with many foreign interests invested in it, other countries, such as the United States, Great Britain, and France attempted to negotiate a ceasefire between Japan and China. However, Japan refused, instead continuing to mobilize troops in the region. On February 12, American, British, and French representatives brokered a half-day cease fire for humanitarian relief to civilians caught in the crossfire. On 30 January, Chiang Kai-shek decided to temporarily relocate the capital from Nanjing to Luoyang as an emergency measure, since Nanjing's proximity to Shanghai could make it a target. On February 12, the Japanese issued another ultimatum, demanding that the Chinese Army retreat twenty kilometers from the border of Shanghai Concessions, a demand promptly refused by the Chinese forces. This only intensified fighting in Hongkew. The Japanese were still not able to take the city by the middle of February, and the number of Japanese troops was increased to nearly ninety thousand with the arrival of the 9th infantry Divisdion and the IJA 24th Mixed Brigade, supported by eighty warships and three hundred airplanes.)

From 1935-1937, he was attached to the IJA 12th Infantry Regiment, and became commander of the IJA 78th Infantry Regiment in 1938, after his promotion to colonel the previous year. Horii was appointed commander of the IJA 55th Division (part of the South East Force) in 1941.

During the New Guinea campaign, Horii and his South Seas detachment were assigned to the invasion of Port Moresby, but were turned back by Allied forces during the Battle of the Coral Sea. As a result, after landing in the Buna-Garara area in July 1942, Horii led a column of 8,500 men of the IJA 144th Regiment overland on the Kokoda Trail over the treacherous Owen Stanley mountain range in an attempt to capture Port Moresby. After heavy fighting against a small Australian Army and Militia Force, however, the Japanese were delayed and defeated, and Horii was forced to withdraw with his surviving soldiers in the Kokoda Track campaign from September 1942.

Horii drowned while crossing the Kumusi River when his raft capsized in November 1942.

2. The Australian Commander

Field Marshal Sir Thomas Albert Blamey GBE, KCB, CMG, DSO, ED

Field Marshal Sir Thomas Albert Blamey GBE, KCB, CMG, DSO, ED (24 January 1884 – 27 May 1951) was an Australian General of the Second World War and the first, and to date only, Australian to attain the rank of Field Marshal. Blamey served in the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF) in the First World War. In mid-1914 Blamey had been in Britain on the staff of the Wessex Division. In November he sailed for Egypt, along with Harry Chauvel, to join the Australian contingent and became intelligence officer on the staff of the Australian 1st Division for the Battle of Gallipoli. During the landing at Anzac Cove, Blamey was sent to evaluate the need for reinforcements by Colonel M'Cay's 2nd Brigade on 400 Plateau. He confirmed that they were in such need, and the reinforcements were sent.

On the night of 13 May 1915, Blamey, in his capacity as intelligence officer, led a patrol consisting of himself, Sergeant J.H. Will and Bombardier A.A. Orchard, behind the Turkish lines in an effort to locate the Olive Grove guns that had been harassing the beach. Near Pine Ridge, an enemy party of eight Turks approached and one of them went to bayonet Orchard, so Blamey shot him with his revolver. In the action that followed, six Turks were killed. Blamey withdrew his patrol back to the Australian lines without locating the guns. Later, examination of the fuse setting on a dud round revealed that the guns were much further to the south than had been realised.

Blamey was always interested in technical innovation. He was instrumental in the adoption of the periscope rifle at Gallipoli, an instrument which he saw during an inspection of the front line. He arranged for the inventor, Lance Corporal W.C.B. Beech, to be seconded to division headquarters to develop the idea. Within a few days, the design was perfected and periscope rifles began to be used throughout the Australian trenches.

When the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lieutenant General Sir Cyril Brudenell White, retired in 1923, Blamey was expected to succeed him as CGS as he had as chief of staff of the Australian Corps in France. However there were objections from more senior officers, so the Inspector General, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel, was made CGS as well, and Blamey was given the new post of Second CGS, in which he performed most of the duties of CGS.On 1 September 1925, Blamey transferred from the Permanent Military Forces to the Militia, and on 1 May 1926 he took command of the 10th Infantry Brigade, part of the 3rd Division. Blamey took command of the division on 23 March 1931 and was promoted to major-general, one of only four militia officers promoted to this rank between 1929 and 1939. In 1937 he was transferred to the unattached list.

On 13 October 1939, Blamey was promoted lieutenant-general and appointed to command the 6^th division, the first formation of the newSecond Australian Imperial Force. Generals John Lavarack and Gordon bennett also were considered for the post, and had their supporters, but Blamey was the preferred choice of Prime Minister Robert Menzies. Menzies limited Blamey's choice of commanders by insisting that they be selected from the Militia rather than the Permanaent Military Forces.

Blamey travelled to the Middle-East with the 2nd AIF as its commander. He occasionally clashed with the British Commanders-in-Chief Middle East, General Archibald Wavell and his successor, General Claude Auchinleck, over the employment of Australian forces. He refused to allow his troops to perform police duties in Palestine, and insisted that they remain together as cohesive units, and no Australian forces were to be deployed or engaged without the prior consent of the Australian government. The government strengthened his hand by promoting him to full general, and Blamey was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief Middle East

However, Blamey was not inflexible and permitted Australian units to be detached when there was a genuine military need. Because the situation in the Middle East tended to lurch from crisis to crisis, this resulted in his troops becoming widely scattered at times. Blamey has been criticised for allowing Australian troops to be sent on a dangerous mission to Greece after he had been told that Menzies had approved and Menzies had been informed that Blamey had approved. Blamey was under no illusions about the odds of success and immediately prepared plans for an evacuation. Blamey's foresight and determination saved many of his men but he lost credibility when he chose his son to fill the one remaining seat on the aircraft carrying him out of Greece. He was Mentioned in Despatches, and awarded the Greek Military Cross, First Class.

In the Syrian campaign (against the Vichy French), Blamey took decisive action to resolve the command difficulties caused by General Henry Maitland Wilson's attempt to direct the fighting from the King David Hotel in Jerusalem by interposing Lieutenant-General John Lavarack's I Corps headquarters.

Later Blamey forced another showdown with Auchinleck over his insistence that the Australian 9th Division be withdrawn from Tobruk, allowing his command to be concentrated in Syria. Blamey was supported by Prime Minister John Curtin and Auchinleck was forced to back down. For his campaigns in the Middle East, he was created a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath (KCB) on 1 January 1942.

In 1942, Blamey was recalled to Australia to become the Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces (AMF), and then Commander of Allied Land Forces as well. Some of Blamey's most controversial actions concern the period after the Japanese declared war, and United States General Douglas MacArthur retreated to Australia.

11. War comes to Papua New Guinea.

2011-01-25T15:40:00.005+11:00

Before the war there was no real Australian interest in PNG. There was a lack of economic endeavour and consequent poor financial gain caused by a paucity of funding and protective legislation.Then there was the ruggedness of the land itself. There was a deep cultural ignorance and unawareness of PNG’s strategic significance.Australian policy and Australians were looking elsewhere!

Photograph from a Japanese plane of Battle Ship Row at the beginning of the attack.

Then the Japanese attacked the American Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour on 7-8 December 1941, followed by the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse two days later. Hong Kong fell and then the Japanese attacked Rabaul on 23 January 1942.

Map of Japanese landings at Corregidor

Ambon was attacked a week later and on 31 December the Commonwealth Forces withdrew from the Malayan peninsula into the bastion of Fortress Singapore. The nightmare continued with the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942. With Singapore gone little stood between the Japanese and the shores of Australia.

War correspondent Robert Sherrod, of Time Magazine,

in front of the remains of the Darwin Post Office, June 1942.

The first air raid on Port Moresby on3 February was like a bucket of cold water being tossed over the Australian public but on 19 February when the Japanese struck at mainland Australia through the air raids on Darwin, Australia’s northern-most city and the Japanese landing on Timor sent shockwaves through the nation.

The 2nd AIF's main strength consisted of five divisions: the 6th, 7^th, 8^th and 9th, and the 1^st Armoured Division. Divisions numbered 1st to 5th were Militia divisions, as were the 10th through 12th and the 2nd and 3rd Armoured Divisions. Units of the Second AIF prefixed their numbers with a '2/' (pronounced 'second') to distinguish themselves from Militia units. Where such a unit did not exist in the First AIF or the Militia, the '2/' was not initially used, but later it was generally adopted as identifying a unit of the Second AIF.

The 6^th, 7^th and 8^th Divisions were in the Middle East. The 7th Division, under Major General Arthur Allen and other Australian units formed the body of the Allied invasion of Lebanon and Syria in 1941. The division's 18th Infantry Brigade fought at Tobruk. Following the outbreak of war in the Pacific, elements of the 7th Division were sent to the Dutch East Indies, reinforcing a few 8th division units. The bulk of the 7th Division was deployed in support of Militia battalions engaged in a rearguard action on the Kokoda Track Campaign in New Guinea.

In the second half of 1941 the Australian government and the Australian Army had began to consider how best to strengthen the nation’s home defences and to provide the home army with more experienced commanders. To this end it began to withdraw some of its more experienced officers from the Divisions fighting the Germans in the Middle East. Three of those were commanders promoted on high merit: Brigadiers Rowell, Vasey and Clowes. On January 3 1942 the British wanted two of the AIF Divisions in the Middle East shifted to the Far East. The 6^th and 7^th Divisions were chosen. The Japanese rapid subjugation of their destination points soon changed that. What followed was a confrontation between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin. Curtin won the confrontation and the convoy carrying the 7^th Division, one to shoulder the burden of the PNG Campaign, arrived back in Australia during march 1942.

Most of the 8th Division' was sent to Malaya to strengthen the garrison prior to war with Japan, while the remaining battalions were deployed in the Dutch East Indies and New Guinea. Consequently, most of the division was lost at the Fall of Singapore in February 1942, where the division lost 1,789 killed and 1,306 wounded; another 15,395 were captured. The divisional commander, Major General Henry Gordon Bennett created an enduring controversy by escaping.

On 18 March 1942 General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Australia from his post in the Philippines (rapidly falling to the Japanese invaders) on the orders of president Roosevelt. On that date it was announced that he had been appointed Supreme Allied Commander, South West Pacific Area. MacArthur had only 2 Divisions of raw, poorly led young conscript American troops in Australia whose build-up would not be completed until May. Australia had the recently returned and battle-hardened 7^th Division and a Brigade of the Sixth Division in addition to five poorly trained Divisions of militia. It was the Australians who were to provide the ‘blood’ for MacArthur’s South West Pacific defence.

General Blamey arrived back in Australia on 23 March to learn that he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all Australian Military Forces. Not without some degree of friction as Major General Herring, Brigadier Steel and Major-General Vasey called on the Defence Minister, Frank Forde, with the aim of ‘dethroning’ Blamey through his enforced retirement. Rowell refused to join this group. Blamey survived but lost out to MacArthur who Prime Minister Curtin appointed as his chief military adviser. Blamey had to learn from the Australian government what Curtin and MacArthur had decided as the best course of action in processing the war. Blamey did have one victory. He accepted General Sturde’s restructuring recommendations for the Australian army. The state-based command system was disbanded.. The army was divided into the First Army, responsible for the defence of New South Wales and Queensland: the Second Army, responsible for the defence of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania: the 3^rd Corps to defend Western Australia: North Territory Force: the forces in PNG and the Land Headquarters Units. There was a concomitant shake-up of the general officer staffing.

Senior Allied commanders in New Guinea in October 1942.

Left to right: Mr Frank Forde (Australian Minister for the Army);

MacArthur; General Sir Thomas Blamey, Allied Land Forces;

Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, Allied Air Forces;

Lieutenant General Edmund Herring, New Guinea Force;

Brigadier General Kenneth Walker, V Bomber Command

In April 1942 the Japanese Imperial Headquarters now ordered the capture of Port Moresby, Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia as a jumping off point to the invasion and capture of Australia and that to become a base to strike at the United States. Port Moresby was identified as the first objective but on May 1 the American Navy played its tactical trump card. By deploying their carriers USS Lexington and Yorktown into the Coral Sea the Americans were able to intercept the Japanese invasion fleet bound for Port Moresby. While the Americans lost more shipping and ordinance than the Japanese the telling difference was that the invasion fleet was turned back and Port Moresby gained a critical reprieve.

**************************************************************************

10. Papua New Guinea – pre-World War II.

2011-01-25T13:41:00.001+11:00

Papua New Guinea (PNG) lies 150 miles (240klms) from mainland Australia. It is positioned just south of the Equator with its main island constituting four fifths of its land mass and the remainder made up of hundreds of coastal islands of varying size. The main island is dominated by an extremely rugged east-west central mountain spine with peaks at times over 13,000 feet (about 4,000 metres). This dominant feature is cut by numerous rushing rivers and creeks which, along with volcanic action, have produced areas of soil-rich inland and and coastal lowland fields. The vegetation in the highlands is dominated by thick tropical rain forest, jungle and man-made grasslands.The latter are the by-product of centuries of burning, clearing and planting and the resultant regrowth of vegetation. Along many parts of the coastline the landscape is dominated by many grasslands and swamps. From the air the terrain is viewed as an impressive, rugged impenetrable and inhospitable region.

The climate of PNG is hot and humid and dominated by high rainfall all year long.”The Wet Season” is usually between October and May and, apart from Port Moresby which is in a rain shadow, the rainfall is very high – it rains every day, without warning and falls in torrential downpours. The temperature and humidity is high during the day but can plunge during the nights, while the coastal lowlands remain hot and humid all year round.

Prior to the onset of WWII there were at least seven hundred different languages which demonstrated the isolation and diversity of its inhabitants – a direct consequence of the nature of its geography. In hundreds of isolated little parts of the the country small clans or tribes existed and were based on ‘kinship through marriage, blood lines or adoption’. To use the term “village” is misleading in the PNG context: such groups lived in a small group as three or four families, while others might be part of a hundred or more family groups. All clans had access to their own lands on which subsistence crops were grown: taro, yam, sago, sweet potato, bananas and various leaves of different vegetables. Meat was procured by hunting or catching marsupials, reptiles, fish and pigs. The land was used through and almost ageless cycle – let it dry, burn, plant, reap and move on within the boundaries of your land, allowing the used soil to rest and repeat the cycle.

Huli Wigman from the Southern Highlands

In the highlands there were no roads, hardly any trails and mostly rough hewn tracks known by the locals.

Pre-The Great War PNG was divided into three European “Protectorates”. After the war the British dependency was ceded to Australia and Australia seized the German territory on the Eastern mainland and New Britain and the islands from the Admiralties to Bouganville. Australia established a civil administration in 1920 over the areas it claimed at the Versailles Peace Conference. The period of Papuan history from 1906 to WWII was dominated by Lieutenant Governor Sir Hubert Murray. Murray was born into an Irish-catholic family in Sydney, was an oxford law graduate. When Australia took over Papua in 1906 a Royal Commission was established to determine the best way to administer the territory. The two key issues facing the Commission were how best to deal with land tenure and how to utilise the indigenous people as a cheap labour supply.

Murray chose to allow whites to lease land for the purpose of mining or plantation production. Murray presided over a system whereby local natives signed on as indentured labourers for a period – usually eighteen months. The early period of Murray’s administration were marked by what he called ‘the oil stain’ policy. He deployed small patrols to pierce and pacify the interior with the use of weapons only permissible in self-defence. An outpost or station was like a small drop of oil on water, it spread. By adding other drops in other localities the ‘oil stain’ spread until its edges merged with the adjoining outpost so that patrol officers were in reasonably frequent contact with each other over the length and breadth of the territory. It was a process not unlike that employed by the North-West Mounted Police in Canada during Canada’s formative years.

A Patrol Officer ("Kiap") checking a native canoe.

New Guinea, 1948.

(Photographer: James (Jim) Fitzpatrick. NAA: A1200, L9830)

Hewa patrol leaving camp on a kunai plain. (Photographer: Tom Webster)

Murray died barely two years before the Pacific War came to Papua with a rapidity of defeat and brutality that was to shock the western world and its associated notions of white supremacy. For the white planter, miner, district magistrate or patrol officer – and sometimes missionary – their local knowledge of the terrain and the indigenous people was to prove invaluable. Together with the natives, these white adventurers were to become an intriguing substitute for the modern infrastructure of war.

**************************************************************************

9. The Declaration of war and military preparedness.

2011-01-25T12:07:00.001+11:00

German expansionism threatened the security of Europe and Japan’s ambitions for a wider empire (especially in regions rich in primary products the Japanese were finding increasingly harder to obtain as trade embargoes tightened as a result of their incursions into China) during the 1930’s resulted in successive Australian governments placing faith in their military, alliances with the ‘Mother Country’ and trust in the British diplomacy of appeasement. This despite many warnings of impending disaster.

Japanese troops enter Mukden,

The Mukden Incident, also known

as the Manchurian Incident

Most Australians believed any future forces committed to a European theatre of conflict would be recovered, in time, and they had trust in the impregnability of the security screen of Fortress Singapore. The Japanese military, through their actions in China, particularly Nanking, gave evidence of their ruthless and merciless intentions and actions.

On the 3^rd September 1939, Prime Minister Robert Menzies, announced that as a result of Britain being at war with Germany …”as a result, Australia is also at war.” We were at war with Nazi Germany.

War is declared against Nazi Germany

Like the situation of The Great War, Australia had two types of armies. The first was the longstanding volunteer army. The second was the militia army which was considered inferior as it was raised out of need for an ‘economical army’, given initial training, weekly or second weekly sessions and an annual two week camp. The Australian army at the declaration of war was a threadbare defensive force and hardly capable of any overseas service or offensive action at home. Conscription was considered abhorrent by the majority of Australian electors and during The Great War two referendums on the conscription issue were defeated. The government of the day decided to raise a Second Australian Imperial Force (2^nd AIF) as a political expedient to avoid the conscription issue and a decision which was to bedevil the Army until the end of the war with the Army divided into what was, in effect, two armies.

2nd AIF Recruiting Poster

Many of the initial volunteers for the 2^nd AIF were no doubt driven by a sense of duty to the British Empire and also by their belief that it was their duty as an Australian. There was the added attraction of travel and adventure as a large overseas force and also to emulate the deeds of their predecessors of the 1^st AIF – those fathers and uncles or other contacts who were living, breathing examples of a proud history of honour and service to king and country. There is just as much evidence, however, that many joined for less romantic ideals. One Labor politician described them as ‘economic conscripts’ when describing the initial recruits. These were men, unemployed, being offered ‘Five bob a day (5 shillings), food and lodgings instead of the dole’ which was then eight shillings and sixpence a week. There were also many who joined the AIF and took a paycut to do so!

Members of the Australian 56th Battalion (militia)

standing at ease at a training camp.

Just as there were many reasons for joining there were also many reason for not doing so. Bitterness and frustration born of despair in the great Depression caused as many not to join as it did those who did join. There was also a belief that an Australian army was for the defence of Australia and not some foreign nation, no more European bloodbaths of young Australians in futile battles. Still many others were in ‘reserved occupations’, skilled and valued workers who would deplete the national workforce if released to join up. There was a division between the AIF and the militia with the former frequently referring to the militia as ‘Chocos’, or, ‘chocolate soldiers’ who would melt if ever facing real action. There was also the fact that the conscription law of service meant that the militia could only fight on Australian soil, something the men of the AIF resolutely believed would never happen. Thus the other term for the militia ‘”Koalas” – a protected species and not for exporting or shooting at. At the same time the militia saw the AIF as arrogant and the cynical referred to them as ‘five-bob-a-day murderers’, or ‘five-bob-a-day tourists’.

It would take the Papuan Campaign to draw a divided army together.

**************************************************************************

8. Australia – 1930 to 1939

2011-01-25T10:53:00.005+11:00

For Australians the decade of the 1930s began with problems of huge unemployment, because the fall of the stock markets on Wall Street reduced confidence throughout the world. Most governments reacted to the crisis with similar policies, aimed at slashing back government spending and paying back loans. The Australian government could do little to change the effects of the slump and the tough economic times ahead. This affected the country in many ways.

In 1931, over 1000 unemployed men marched

from the Esplanade to the Treasury Building

in Perth, Western Australia, to see the

Premier, Sir James Mitchell.

Because of the economic downturn, people’s lives changed drastically. Australia had supplied huge amounts of wool for uniforms during World War 1, and many exports helped Australia achieve a high standard of living in the 1920s. The majority of the people of Australia lived very well prior to the fall, so they felt the effects of the depression strongly. Because of the severe economic contraction, the reduction of purchasing goods, employers couldn’t afford to keep excessive workers. A five year unemployment average for 1930-34 was 23.4%,with a peak of 28% of the nation being unemployed in 1932. This was one of the most severe unemployment rates in the industrialised world, exceeded only by Germany.

Many hundreds of thousands of Australians suddenly faced the humiliation of poverty and unemployment. This was still the era of traditional social family structure, where the man was expected to be the sole bread winner. Soup kitchens and charity groups made brave attempts to feed the many starving and destitute. The suicide rates increased dramatically and it became clear that Australia had limits to the resources for dealing with the crisis. The depression's sudden and wide spread unemployment hit the soldiers who had just returned from war the hardest as they were in their mid thirties and still suffering the trauma of their wartime experiences. At night many slept covered in newspapers at Sydney’s Domain or at Salvation Army refugees.

The limited jobs that did arise were viciously fought for. The job vacancies were advertised in the daily newspaper, which formed massive queues to search for any job available. This then caused the race to arrive first at the place of employment (the first person to turn up was usually hired.)

Unlike the United States, where Roosevelt's "New Deal" stimulated the American economy, New Zealand where Michael Savage's pioneering welfare state rapidly reduced hardship, or the United Kingdom where rearmament (from 1936) reduced unemployment, there was no significant mechanism for economic recovery in Australia.

Federation in 1901 had granted only limited power to the federal government. For example, income taxes were collected by the State governments. High tariffs worked to hurt the economy, but powerful interest groups permitted no change in this aspect of policy. There was no significant banking reform or nationalisation of private businesses.

While the 1920’s saw a postwar rush of patriotism, pride and confidence that was expressed in many ways – the expansion of the nation’s iron and steel industry; an impressive capital works program of harbour development, bridge building and road construction; and ambitious program of land settlement, migration and the development of of the nation’s resources, the great depression was a cruel blow to this new country. Social welfare systems were virtually non-existent. The immediate enemy was the employer who either sacked you or cut your wages and conditions (or looked as though he could and would at any time) while the bank manager or the landlord became the uncompromising collector of your housing loan repayments or your rent. If you were ‘on the land’ what you could earn for your produce was barely sufficient to meet your creditors or bank manager.

But there was one basic humiliating form of help. If you could show you had been unemployed for at least a fortnight and that you had absolutely no means of support to fall back on, sustenance coupons were available to fall back on. Being on “Susso’ was a demeaning experience for Australian men. It was an admission that he could no longer support his family. Join the queues at the labour exchange and register as unemployed, being mocked by public servants, then there was the humiliation of the ‘special shops’ which told your neighbours that your family was on sustenance.

CR Gotts, Sustenance projects during

the depression - campsite in the forest,

1921–1940, photograph: gelatin silver.

Image courtesy of the

National Library of Australia: nla.pic-an20865637-49

The devaluation of the Australian pound, abandonment of the Gold Standard, recovery of major trading partners like the United Kingdom and public works projects instituted by State and local governments led to a slow recovery. Unemployment, which peaked at 29% in 1932, was 11% at the start of the Second World War.

Out of the depression came a brand of fatalism and a certain physical and emotional resilience: you took what life or circumstances dealt you and pressed on. Such a view of life and living during the depression – being ‘the fowl man’, ‘the pie man’, or ‘the trapper’ who sold rabbits and their skins at the local pub or wherever the elusive market might be – would stand these men in good stead in Papua.

The old soldier turned Rabbit Trapper.

Thus we had the emergence of the Australian man who lived with hardship and want: who struggled against all odds to survive and to take care of his own; a society in which ‘mateship’ became a valued attribute and a social standard.

"I'd like to be a pieman, and ring a little bell,
Calling out, "Hot pies! Hot pies to sell!"
Apple-pies and Meat-pies, Cherry-pies as well,
Lots and lots and lots of pies - more than you can tell.
Big, rich Pork-pies! Oh, the lovely smell!
   But I wouldn't be a pieman if ...
      I wasn't very well.
         Would you?"

**************************************************************************

7. The end of Singapore

2011-01-22T18:34:00.000+11:00

By January 18, a British military intelligence assessment shows the extent of the Japanese threat in the Muar area and on the trunk road front. Percival and Bennett, recognising the hopelessness of the task they had taken, agree to withdraw Westforce behind the Segamat River as a preliminary to a more extensive withdrawal south. Before dawn, Bennett moves the Australian 2/19th Battalion across from Jemaluang in Eastern Johore to Bakri on the Yong Peng-Muar road. The Australian 2/29th Battalion reinforcements are also called in and are in position at Bakri less than half an hour before the Japanese attack. Despite heavy casualties, the Australians successfully repelled the attack. At Muar, the Japanese attack the 45th Indian Brigade and gunners from the 8th Australian Division, later reinforced by Australian Battalions from Gemas and Mersing.

A Japanese force advances from Batu Pahat and drives the Norfolks from Bukit Pelandok, cutting all land communications with the Australian and Indian forces at Bakri. Japanese air attacks hit the Indian 45th Brigade headquarters at Bakri and kills nearly all the staff. Lt-Col Charles G.W. Anderson, from the Australian 2/19th Battalion assumes overall command of the area.

Sir Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain during World War II, issues a 10-point strategy for the defence of Singapore, stating that "…Singapore must be converted into a citadel and defended to the death. No surrender can be contemplated." Wavell warns Prime Minister Churchill that he doubts whether the Island could be held for long "when Johore is lost".

January 20 - Wavell tells Percival to hold south Johore as long as possible. Maj-Gen. Gordon Bennett had moves his Westforce headquarters back to Yong Peng and orders a general retreat south. In the early hours of the morning, Anderson moves out of Bakri planning to be in Parit Sulong by nightfall, but his withdrawing troops quickly encounter a series of Japanese roadblocks and hand-to-hand clashes with Japanese troops ensues. When the troops finally reach Parit Sulong late at night, they discover the vital bridge there held by a heavily fortified Japanese machinegun position. Anderson and his troops attempt to dislodge the Japanese hold on the bridge but are unable to withstand the attack by tanks, aircraft and artillery.

Orders given by Bennett for British forces to rescue the troops at Parit Sulong are overlooked.

On January 22 a final effort is made to drive the Japanese from the Parit Sulong bridge. When this fails, Anderson allows his troops to escape through the jungle to Yong Peng, leaving the wounded in the care of volunteers. The actions at Bakri and Parit Sulong allow Westforce and the rearguard of the British 53rd Brigade to cross Yong Peng Bridge by midnight. The bridge is then demolished.

The Australian 2/4 Machine Gun Battalion and 2000 reinforcements arrive in Singapore on January 24.

Percival, Bennett and Heath initiate the withdrawal. Orders are issued for the retreat to Johore Bahru. Westforce troops withdraw to the south. Japanese troops land near the mouth of the Endau river. Percival decides to withdraw completely upon Singapore Island. Wavell allows Percival to withdraw to Singapore but stresses that Singapore must be held.

On January 28 Heath gives Bennett withdrawal schedules for the departure of British forces across the Causeway. The British 18th Division arrives at Singapore Harbour late at night and the following night the Duchess of Bedford arrives full of Indian reinforcements.

The retreat across the Causeway begins and British forces withdraw fully to Singapore. Malaya is lost to the Japanese.

The Japanese face Singapore from Johore Bahru. The Battle for Singapore begins.

The British construct a heavy defence front in Southern Johore. Heavy fighting breaks out at Batu Pahat and the forces withdraw to Senggarang. A Japanese air battalion, ammunition and vehicles land at Endau. The Japanese proceed towards Johore Bahru. 10 miles from Mersing, the Australian 2/18th battalion ambush the Japanese. Indian sappers blow up 70 feet of the Causeway which links Malaya and Singapore and signals a complete withdrawal from the peninsula. Japanese aircraft bomb Tanjong Pagar Railway Station and the oil storage tanks at the Naval Base.

By February 4 the Japanese gun Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang airfields and installations. Civilians living in north Singapore are evacuated. Japanese guns from Johore Bahru open fire on Australian positions in the northern sector of the island of Singapore as the remaining troops of the British 18th Division arrive in Singapore.

February 6 - Japanese artillery fire intensifies along the north-eastern front. Demolition of the Naval Base begins. At least one fuel tank at the Naval Base is hit. Various areas in Singapore are hit including Government House. The Australian defences in the north and northwest are also blasted. Three of the four troopships carrying the British 18th Division reach Singapore; the Empress of Asia, carrying vital weapons and ammunition is sunk. Percival tells Bennett the defence line is thinly held and says that defence would be very difficult.

On February 7 the Japanese invasion begins when soon after nightfall, 400 men of the Japanese Imperial Guards Division land and take Pulau Ubin which overlooks Changi. They encounter minimum resistance. Japanese artillery and aircraft begin shelling western Singapore heavily. The artillery then concentrates on the northwest shoreline until 7pm. Communications are completely cut between forward and rear command headquarters. At 8pm the first Japanese assault boat heads for the Singapore coast. Fierce fighting at 8.30pm signals the start of the invasion. In the night 13,000 Japanese troops of Yamashita's first wave land in Singapore. Another 10,000 land soon after dawn.

February 9 - Japanese pilots blast military headquarters in the Australian defence areas. Bennett orders the Australian 2/29th Battalion to the north-west sector. The Japanese reach Ama Keng Village. The 12th Indian Brigade arrives at Keat Hang Road. Brigadier Taylor orders a withdrawal from the Jurang Line. Despite fierce opposition, by late afternoon the Japanese take Tengah airfield which was built to support the defences of the Naval Base. Yamashita targeted it as one of the key positions to be captured in his military strategy. Brigadier Taylor reports later that the "enemy had attacked in strength" and that he had to retreat.

In the evening the Japanese assemble at the waterfront. 4000 men are in the first wave to land between Tanjong Buloh and Tanjong Murai on the northwest coast of Singapore.

February 10 - At Kranji, Australian machine gunners of the 27th Brigade nearly stop an assault by the Japanese Imperial Guards. By dawn, the Japanese complete the landing. The Australian Forces are ordered to retreat from the Kranji area. By mid-afternoon, the Kranji-Jurong line has fallen.

Churchill cables Wavell: "There must be…no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population...The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake…"

By dawn the Japanese control Bukit Timah village.

The Indian Military Base Hospital at Tyersall is bombed, killing 700 wounded Indian soldiers.

Yamashita writes to Percival asking for his surrender.

Percival withdraws to a last city defence perimeter circling Kallang Airfield, Thomson Village, MacRitchie Reservoir, Adam, Farrer, Holland and Buona Vista Roads. Racecourse Village and MacRitchie Reservoir are captured. The Gurkhas are forced to retreat from Nee Soon Village. British anti-tank gunners halt a charge down Bukit Timah Road. In the Ulu Pandan area, the Australian 22nd Brigade repels repeated ground attacks. Governor Shenton Thomas orders valuable resources and machinery destroyed. Bukit Panjang Village is lost. Percival's orders are misunderstood as instructions to move to the given defence positions. A whole chain of withdrawals from the northern part of the Kranji-Jurong line begins, giving the Line to the Japanese.

Around 4am, the Australians withdraw and the Singapore end of the Causeway is taken. Yamashita, running low on ammunition, again writes to Percival inviting his surrender. Pasir Panjang Ridge falls to the Japanese after a fierce battle with the 1st Battalion of the Malay Regiment. The Japanese capture Alexandra Barracks and MacRitchie Reservoir.

By February 14 the Japanese control the three military airfields and the three main reservoirs. Water supply failure threatens. The Japanese kills staff and patients in Alexandra Hospital. Only three men escape. Wavell cables Churchill to say the situation is hopeless. Churchill gives permission to surrender.

A plaque commemorating the massacre

and expanding on the hospital's

history after the war

February 15 - Wavell's last cable says that "so long as you are in position to inflict losses and damage to enemy and your troops are physically capable of doing so you must fight on...When you are fully satisfied that this is no longer possible I give you discretion to cease resistance." Percival decides to surrender.

At 1715 hours, Percival and his staff arrive at the Ford Motor Factory and surrenders unconditionally to the Japanese. The surrender documents are signed.

Lt Gen. Arthur Percival, led by a Japanese officer,

walks under a flag of truce to negotiate the capitulation

of Allied forces in Singapore, on 15 February 1942.

Lt Gen Yamashita (seated, centre) thumps the table

with his fist to emphasise his terms –

unconditional surrender. Lt Gen Percival sits between his

officers, his clenched hand to his mouth

6. Retreat to Singapore

2011-01-22T17:18:00.004+11:00

Japanese tanks and troops press down the main north-south trunk route into British forward positions at Trolak. Heavy fighting ensues at Slim River and several Japanese tanks are destroyed, but the advance continues following the arrival of tank reinforcements. Losses ultimately force the British forces into retreat and at 8.30am the Slim River bridge is taken by the Japanese. The day-long fighting all but wipes out the Indian 11th Division's 12th and 28th Brigades. About 3,200 British troops surrender and losses in equipment are also huge. Gen Sir Archibald Wavell meets the survivors of the Slim River battle and is appalled by their condition. He orders Lt-Gen Sir Lewis Heath to begin planning a 150 mile withdrawal from Buta Caves to Johore. On the insistence of Wavell, Percival issues completely revised orders for the retreat to Johore.

Type 95 Japanese Tank

Those orders call for the establishment of Westforce under Bennett's command. The Australian general's tactical area of responsibility is defined as all that section of Johore State above the east-west line: Mersing, Kluang, Batu Pahat. On the key north-west frontier of Johore, Bennett's line of defence is to run from Segamat in the centre, through Mount Ophir to Muar in the west. This withdrawal to Johore means the instant abandonment of the states of Negri Sembilan and Selangor and is scheduled to begin the next day. Only hours before the withdrawal is due to start, the Japanese attack Serendah, the Gurkha position to the north of Kuala Lumpur and after bitter fighting it falls to the Japanese. Following another command conference at Segamat, Percival, Heath and Bennet inspect the Gemencheh River Bridge, 10 miles from Gemas, which the Australian general has chosen as the site for a major ambush of the advancing Japanese.

By January 11 the British Indian forces completed their withdrawal through Kuala Lumpur in the early hours, blowing up the last bridge there at 4.30am. At 8pm the Japanese enter the capital and seize its two airfields. Japanese forces carry out their first airstrikes at Muar.

The massive withdrawal underway results in congestion along the main trunk road running south and along the single track rail line to Singapore. 112 Japanese aircraft direct an attack on Singapore.

On January 13 United States merchant ships arrive at Singapore carrying the 53rd British Infantry Brigade, two anti-tank regiments and 50 hurricane fighter aircraft. At 4am as Bennett officially assumes command of the Malayan front, Australian positions on the fall-back defence line are getting ready. At about 4pm, 300 Japanese infantrymen on cycles pass over the Gemencheh River Bridge where the 2/30th Battalion of the Australian 27th Brigade is lying in wait. After 500 or so cycle by, the Australians blow the bridge and ambush the Japanese. The ambush lasts about 20 minutes and 700 Japanese troops die. By late evening the Australians, with eight dead and eighty wounded, withdraw through five kilometres of jungle and rubber plantations to the battalion lines.

On January 15 Yamashita rushes elements of the Japanese Imperial Guards from Malacca and quickly they command the northern bank of the Muar River, situated opposite Muar town. At night the Japanese transfer forces to the south side of the river, capture the town and cut the vital Muar-Yong Peng road. This Japanese thrust eastwards threatens to sever the main north-south route from Maj-Gen. Gordon Bennett's Westforce headquarters at Segamat, and open a side door for a large Japanese flanking movement to Yong Peng. Japanese troops move south by sea, landing up to beyond Batu Pahat.

Faced with a withdrawal from Segamat or an attempt to stabilise the Muar front, Lt-Gen. Arthur E. Percival and Maj-Gen. Gordon Bennett decide to reinforce the Muar front at Bakri. On January 17 Percival orders the newly arrived British 53rd Brigade Group into Johore as reinforcements. The 6th Norfolk Battalion of the 53rd move into Bukit Pelandok. Five miles down the Yong Peng-Muar road a Norfolk platoon defends Parit Sulong Bridge. The Indian 45th Brigade headquarters stand at Bakri

Sergeant Charles Parsons' anti-tank gunners firing on

Type 95 Ha-Go tanks at point blank range on

the Muar-Parit Sulong road, 18 January 1942.

At Gemas, the Australian 2/30th Battalion troops, under intense fire from the Japanese, report they are in danger of being overrun. In Johore, the Allied forces try to stop the Japanese from invading Singapore. They bomb the bridge which the Japanese cross but are eventually defeated by another Japanese troop that lands in Johore from the sea.

Japanese troops near Gemas

The Japanese march to Bukit Pelandok and Bakri.

5. Battle of Kampar

2011-01-22T16:53:00.005+11:00

The state of Perak. Kampar is situated in the Kinta district.

On December 30 the Japanese direct out-flanking movements to the east of Kampar where they run into patrols from the Indian 28th Brigade Group. British artillery fire inflicts heavy casualties on the Japanese and block their encirclement efforts. Japanese troops arrive from Kota Bahru by trucks and attack the forward defences of Kuantan which is defended by the 22nd Brigade of the Indian 9th Division. Simultaneously, Japanese aircraft attack targets in and around the township, including the main ferry crossing on the Kuantan river. At Johore headquarters, Percival tells Maj-Gen. Bennett of plans to withdraw to Singapore and to demolish the Causeway between Singapore and Johore Bahru.

The severed causeway on the eve of Japanese invasion in 1942.

The next day The Royal Navy sends five newly-arrived "Eureka" fast patrol craft from Singapore to the Straits of Malacca. All craft are either sunk or driven ashore along Malaya's south-western coastline. The Japanese hurl a ground assault against the Kuantan ferry-crossing aimed at blocking the British retreat. Japanese 5th Division troops begin their seaborne infiltration south. Heath and Percival drive to Slim River for discussions with Col Stewart, commander of the Indian 12th Brigade. All three agree that if the Japanese are to be prevented from over-running the central Malayan airstrips before the expected allied reinforcement convoy arrives in mid-January, the Kuala Kubu road junction must be held along with the key east-west road.

On January 1,1942, the Japanese call up fresh troops. The British pit their artillery against the Japanese planes and tanks with success and by nightfall Kampar's defences remain firmly in British hands. After several days of fighting at Kampar and a high rate of casualties, the Japanese consider retreating for the first time in the conflict. Fate works for the Japanese, however, when a message to the British forces from Changkat Jong states that the Japanese are directly threatening the main supply route from the south and that Kampar must be abandoned. The British forces begin to withdraw just before midnight. Percival returns to Singapore and receives reports of the latest Japanese seaborne infiltration at Kuala Selangor. Yamashita moves his HQ south from Taiping to Ipoh.

It now January 3 1940 and the first British reinforcements arrive in Singapore. These comprise the newly-recruited and untrained Indian 45th Infantry Brigade Group. At Fort Canning Headquarters, Percival and his senior war strategists harbour serious doubts about holding the vital Kuala Kabu road junction. Japan's seaborne infiltrations down the Straits of Malacca have introduced a new and alarming dimension to the conflict. As a result, the decision is made to abandon Kuantan. The troops are ordered to move towards Maran, the fork in the Jerentut road about 60 miles inland and due west of Kuantan. Kuantan is captured by the Japanese. The Japanese hurl ferocious attacks on the rearguard of the withdrawing British Indian troops enroute to Jerantut. They also spring two ambushes along the withdrawal route trapping the 2/12th Frontier Force Regiment.

Only 40 men survive.

The British troops from Kampar withdraw to prepared positions at Slim River on January 4. The defence at Slim River is intensified as other forces withdraw there from the Telok Anson and Bernam River actions. The Japanese push eastwards along the northern bank of the Selangor River for a bitter encounter with a detachment of the Indian 6/15th Brigade at Batang Berjuntai, site of an important bridge. Percival, Heath, Bennett and their top staff officers meet at the Sultan of Johore's Segamat shooting lodge for a review of battlefield strategy. Percival, counting on the arrival of the rest of the promised reinforcements, has devised a new strategic plan - a fall back defence line along a line linking Mersing in the east through Segamat to Muar in the west.

On January 6, Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the joint allied forces.

**************************************************************************

4. A Defensive Wall and its subsequent out-flanking

2011-01-22T15:14:00.001+11:00

On December 19 British troops withdraw to Kuala Kangsar. At dawn a battalion of Argyll and Southern Highlanders drive up the mountainous backroad to Grik with orders to halt the Japanese thrust south. Fierce fighting erupts around the village of Sumpitan. By nightfall the British are forced back four miles to Lenggong.

At Fort Canning Headquarters, Lt-Gen Arthur E. Percival devises an entirely new strategic plan, based on assurances given by London that reinforcements enroute to the Middle East are being diverted to Singapore. The new strategy calls for the conflict to be contained in Malaya's central region, with the new tactics aimed at blocking Japanese access to central Malayan airfields. Critical to future success is the choice of Britain's fall back positions between Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur. Percival selects Kampar as the point for a major stand. He also picks Tapah, Bidor and the Slim River as the best available defence positions after Kampar. Brooke-Popham approves Percival's new strategic approach to the fighting. At the same time, Japanese troops move south on rafts on the Perak River to attack the British at Lenggong and drive them back to Kota Tampan.

The Singapore Armed Forces Training Institution, Fort Canning

In Bangkok, the Siam government signs a complete pact of defensive and offensive alliance with Japan on December 21, to take effect at once, by which Siam would help Japan by all political, military and economic means in her power. Japanese field commanders begin floating troops down Chenderoh Lake. While some rafts are detected and sunk, sizeable numbers of invading troops slip behind British frontlines, by-passing Kuala Kangsar completely. Sensing another disaster, Maj-Gen. Murray-Lyon, Commander of all the British troops west of Perak, orders an immediate withdrawal from the Perak River area. The British abandon the RAF Butterworth airbase after a week of intensive Japanese air raids. Heath's frontline is in chaos and he orders a desperate withdrawal, first to the Krian River, 48 km from Kuala Kangsar, and then to the Perak River.

The 3/2nd Punjab Regiment retreats down Grik road and ambushes the Japanese advance. Although successful, these are the final British actions west of the Perak River.

By mid-morning of December 23 the British withdrawal across the Perak River is completed. Japanese attack Kuala Kangsar. The following day Indian forces clash with Japanese Imperial Guards in the Chemor area. The Indian 6/15th Brigade digs in and fortifies the chosen Kampar defence position. On December 26 Indian forces fight delaying tactics north of Ipoh (Battle of Ipoh) and after suffering high casualties, retreat to positions south of the township. The Japanese Army's 5th Division occupy Ipoh and Yamashita orders the river crossing to Ipoh to begin at 8.00pm. The Japanese cross the Perak River to attack Kuala Lumpur through Kampar. After successful ambushes, the British blast the 2 bridges across the 500m-wide Perak River. The British evacuate Selama and retreat to Kuala Kangsar. Brooke-Popham cables London for reinforcements.

On December 27, during a meeting of senior 25th Army officers, Yamashita reveals his plan for an important switch in battle strategy. He intends sending 1,500 of his 5th Division troops in landing barges south down the Straits of Malacca to infiltrate behind British lines from the coast. At this same time, Commander-in-Chief of the Far East, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham is replaced by Lt-Gen. Sir Henry Pownall. Military intelligence informs Sir Henry Pownall at Fort Canning of reports of 34 Japanese vessels lying off Singora. The following morning, British, Indian and Gurkha forces complete their construction of defensive positions around Kampar, backed by the Lanarkshire Yeomanry's 155th Field Artillery Regiment and gunners from the 88th Field Regiment.

Forward patrolling throughout the day by both sides results in frequent skirmishes. Late in the evening, the four-day battle of Kampar begins.

**************************************************************************

3. The Battle of Jitra

2011-01-22T15:00:00.001+11:00

On the following day the battle of Jitra commenced. In the morning, the Japanese launch a battle to seize Jitra, rushing tank and artillery reinforcements down from Singora. In the late afternoon a sudden Japanese tank charge into British defences north of the town swamps the 1/14th Punjab Regiment and the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles. British troops in Jitra are ordered to retreat south of the township and overnight the British frontline undertakes a ten mile withdrawal. After a 15 hour battle, the Japanese 5th Division capture Jitra and with it a large number of British weapons and vehicles in the area. Japanese planes conduct the first major air raid on Penang. After the destruction of most of the British planes in north Malaya, Malaya Command strategists order that British fighter aircraft will, until reinforcements arrive, only be used in the defence of Singapore bases and for the protection of supply convoys moving north into Malaya.

At dawn, the 6th and 15th Brigades of the Indian 11th Division go into Siam to meet the Japanese advance from Singora. Further east, another Indian force crosses from Kroh to block the Japanese advance from Patani. The next day Malaya Command issues orders for Indian 8th Brigade troops to withdraw from the Kota Bahru area. Under a plan prepared by Lt-Gen. Arthur E. Percival the troops were to begin a retreat south down the rail-line with strong rearguard actions, while vital supplies and equipment were extracted south from Kuala Krai. The 3/16 Punjab Regiment comes under heavy attack from the Japanese at Kroh. Eighty-five Japanese dive-bombers direct massive air raids on Penang.

British troops at the north-western frontline are in full retreat south of Jitra. By December 13 and on December 14 the Japanese enter from the north and take the Alor Star airfield ( left unprotected because of the assumed strength of the Jitra line). The invading troops find the airfield virtually intact. By midday the Japanese begin flying their aircraft in from Singora and Patani. At around 3pm the Japanese attack the Gurun position and in the evening the British withdraw to behind the Muda river. Britain's Far East War Council realise that Penang can only be held for another three or four days and make the decision to abandon it.

Yamashita moves his headquarters to Alor Star on December 15 and the Japanese bomb Penang and seize many ships and boats in the harbour. After a week of intensive Japanese air raids, orders are issued to abandon the air base at Butterworth. British forces also evacuate Penang island. Lt-Gen Sir Lewis Heath, Commander, 3rd Indian Corps orders an urgent withdrawal from the Krian River area. The troops retreat first to the Krian River, 30 miles from the key road junction at Kuala Kangsar, then beyond to the Perak River. On December 17 the Japanese take Penang without losing a man.

The next day British troops from Penang now defend Selama, along the Krian River between Penang and Taiping. Lt-Gen Arthur E. Percival, GOC, Malaya Command, flies to Ipoh for an important strategy meeting with Lt-Gen Sir Lewis Heath, Commander, 3rd Indian Corps. They patch-up Britain's badly-mauled frontline units. Both men realise the futile nature of defending the terrain north of Ipoh and decide that Malaya's second largest population centre would be abandoned.

The Japanese launch a full assault on the island of Hong Kong.

Canadian infantrymen in Hong Kong

Dongjiang guerillas fighting in trenches.

**************************************************************************

2. The Battle for Singapore begins.

2011-01-22T14:51:00.001+11:00

General Tomoyuki Yamashita - The Tiger of Malaya

On December 3 Yamashita decides he'll attempt to capture Singapore on February 11, Japan's National Day and the 2,6000th anniversary of Emperor Jimmu's coronation and on December 4 the Japanese invasion fleet left Samah Harbour, Hainan at dawn, heading south.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was given the discretion to launch Matador without prior reference to London. On December 6 intelligence reports that an RAAF Hudson sighted 3 transports and an escort destroyer heading northwest from Cape Cambodia towards the Gulf of Siam. All British forces within Malaya Command are ordered to "the highest degree of readiness". Matador is nearly launched.

December 7, 1941, without warning or any formal declaration of hostilities, the Japanese destroy a significant proportion of the Pacific American fleet at Pearl Harbor naval base. Hong Kong and the Philippines are invaded simultaneously. America and Britain declare war on Japan.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham decides to delay Matador for the night. RAAF Hudsons spot Japanese ships intermittently in the evening 240km from Kota Bahru. An RAAF Hudson identifies a Japanese cruiser, 4 destroyers and a troopship 112 km from Singora.

The Japanese begin their battle for Singapore on December 7-8 . In the evening, Japanese forces land on the east coast of South Thailand and North Malaya as part of an invasion on simultaneous fronts. At 10pm three Japanese transports land on Sabak-Badang Beach in Kota Bharu and started putting ashore more than twelve thousand men. By 1am, after about an hour fighting, the Japanese assault wave is established on the beachhead. Simultaneously, 16 transports were stood off the Siamese coast preparing to land the first wave of the Japanese 5th Division at Singora and Patani. On December 8, 1941 at 5.20am, Lt-Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita, Commander-in-Chief of the invading Japanese 25th Army, came ashore at Singora with his Japanese troops. The landings at Singora and Patani were unopposed and beach-heads were easily established. By 1.00pm Yamashita reached a compromise agreement with the neutral Siamese Government. At 11.00pm formalities were completed to allow Japanese forces to pass through Siam.

At 4.30am on December 8, in a coordinated surprise attack, 17 Japanese naval bombers, flying from Saigon, attack Singapore's Keppel Harbour Docks, Naval Base and airbases at Tengah and Seletar. During the day Japanese aircraft attack airfields at Alor Star, Sungei Patani, Butterworth and Penang in Malaya's north-west, and Kuala Trengganu and Kuantan on the east coast. Force Z (the codename for the naval force comprising the Prince of Wales, the Repulse and their escort destroyers, HMS Electra, HMS Express, HMS Tenedos and HMAS Vampire) leaves Singapore to intercept the Japanese landings. Seven Royal Australian Air Force Hudson aircraft attack the enemy transports off Kota Bahru. Percival issues orders to cancel all thought of Matador and to take up defence positions astride the roads coming south from the frontier.

Keppel Bay Docks today

At dawn, two companies of the Indian 11th Division are ordered across the border into Siam to meet the Japanese advance south along the road from Singora. Further east, another Indian force crosses the border from Kroh in a move to block the Japanese advance down the Patani road.

At first light on December 9 the Hudsons are sent from Kuantan to bomb the Japanese at Kota Bahru and lose five aircraft doing so. British and Indian defences are forced back from Kota Bahru and by 2pm the Japanese capture the township and the airfield. Within hours the British and Australian forces also abandon Gong Kedah and Machang. The Japanese rapidly occupy the airstrips, which become bases for their own strike aircraft. The airfield at Kuantan is attacked by enemy aircraft and three Royal Australian Air Force Hudsons are destroyed on the ground. All but one in a squadron of British Blenheim bombers are destroyed at Butterworth by a Japanese air raid moments before the craft were due to set off for Singora. The squadron is ordered back to Ipoh. At Jitra the defence continues, designed to protect the airfield at Alor Star. The Japanese drive down the Patani-Kroh road, wipe out Indian troops and cross into Betong.

Two Hudson aircraft from No. 13 Squadron near Darwin in 1940

On December 10 the British battleships, the Prince of Wales and Repulse are sunk by Japanese Navy bombers in the South China Sea, off Kuantan, in an action lasting only one and a half hours.

**************************************************************************

1. Singapore - the Prelude

2011-01-22T14:19:00.003+11:00

Before any discussion of the Australian defence of New Guinea can begin we must look to the circumstances that made New Guinea an imperative defensive point for Australia. We must go back to the outbreak of World War 2 in the Pacific and the absolute might of an all-conquering Japanese military that saw not only the fall of Singapore but also the loss of Hong Kong, the American Fleet almost demolished at Pearl Harbour, the fall of the Philippines and General Douglas Macarthur’s abandonment of his forces in the Far East and his hasty retreat to Australia.

In the beginning - In September 1940 the Planning Chief of Imperial Army Headquarters in Tokyo, posing as a business executive on vacation, explored the island of Singapore and part of the Malayan peninsula. It takes the Japanese planners three days to satisfy themselves that Singapore can only be safely attacked from the mainland. A seaward affront would be disastrous.

One of Singapore's 15-inch coastal defence guns elevated for firing.

With the danger of war in the Pacific steadily growing, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham arrives in November 1940 as Commander-in-Chief of the Far East.. Brooke-Popham opened his General Headquarters, Far East, in Singapore. In December two additional brigades (the 6th and 8th) arrive from India, and two British battalions (the 2/ East Surrey and 1/ Seaforth Highlanders) arrive from Shanghai. The military garrison then included 17 battalions - six British, ten Indian, and one Malay. In addition, the headquarters of the 11th Indian Division had reached Malaya. The Australian Prime Minister, Robert Gordon Menzies offered to send a brigade group to Malaya if necessary and this was accepted by Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Brooke-Popham (left) with General Wavell

In April 1941 the British military strategists in Singapore prepare a secret war plan codenamed "Matador". The new General Officer Commanding Malaya, Lieutenant-General Arthur Ernest Percival ho works out a strategy for his available forces. He plans for one division to defend southern Malaya, leaving a corps of two divisions to meet any attack on the north Malayan frontier. The plan calls for defending forces to cross the Malayan-Siamese frontier 24 hours ahead of any suspected Japanese landing in the southern reaches of the neighbouring kingdom, stopping the Japanese from gaining any beach-heads in southern Siam. Matador predicts that the Japanese were most likely to attempt landings at Singora and Patani and that the best place to stop them would be on the Patani road at a good defensive position called The Ledge.

On August 15 a large contingent of Australian troops arrive in Singapore. A high proportion of Australian forces in Asia were concentrated in Malaya during 1940 and 1941 as the threat from Japan increased. At the outbreak of war the Australian forces in Malaya comprised the 8th Division (less the 23rd Brigade) under the command of Major General Gordon Bennett, four RAAF squadrons and eight warships.

The Commanding Officer of Japan's 25th Army, Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita, receives orders to proceed with the invasion of Singapore on November 30 and subsequently a state of emergency is declared in Singapore on 1^st December.

Singapore is reinforced by the Royal Navy warships, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. The HMS Prince of Wales had been completed in April 1941 and was nicknamed 'HMS Unsinkable' because of her special protective armour. The two capital ships sail in with four escort destroyers: HMS Electra, HMS Express, HMS Tenedos, and HMAS Vampire.

HMS Prince of Wales

HMS Repulse on manoeuvres in the 1920s

HMS Electra, "E" class destroyer built 1932

HMS Express, "E" class destroyer, launched 1934

HMS Tenedos, "S" class destroyer, Commissioned 1919

Hmas Vampire - "V" and "W" class destroyer built 1917

**************************************************************************